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A series of experiments studied how people judge the frequency of death
from various causes. The judgments exhibited a highly consistent but sys-
tematically biased subjective scale of frequency. Two kinds of bias were identi-
fied: (a) a tendency to overestimate small frequencies and underestimate
larger ones, and (b) a tendency to exaggerate the frequency of some specific
causes and to underestimate the frequency of others, at any given level of ob-
jective frequency. These biases were traced to a number of possible sources,
including disproportionate exposure, memorability, or imaginability of vari-
ous events. Subjects were unable to correct for these sources of bias when
specifically instructed to avoid them. Comparisons with previous laboratory
studies are discussed, along with methods for improving frequency judg-
ments and the implications of the present findings for the management of
societal hazards.
How well can people estimate the fre- how small a difference in frequency can be
quencies of the lethal events they may en- reliably detected? Do people have a con-
counter in life (e.g., accidents, diseases, sistent internal scale of frequency for such
homicides, suicides, etc.) ? More specifically, events? What factors, besides actual fre-
quency, influence people's judgments?
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using sequential or simultaneous displays
of lights, letters, numbers or horizontal and
vertical lines. In such tasks, people's esti-
mates of frequency and proportion have
typically been quite accurate. According to
Peterson and Beach (1967), the most strik-
ing aspect of many of these studies was that
the relation between estimated and actual
frequency was described well by the identity
function. Howell's (1973) review of the
literature concluded that "subjects show a
remarkable facility for synthesizing and
storing the repetitive attribute of event oc-
currences. They seem capable of maintain-
ing a number of separate frequency streams
concurrently as evidenced by the creditable
accuracy of frequency retrieval" (p. 51).
Similarly, Estes (1976) observed that sub-
jects in probability-learning experiments
were "extremely efficient" (p. 51) at ac-
quiring relative-frequency information.
Despite these optimistic conclusions, some
studies have found inaccuracies. For exam-
ple, Attneave (1953) and Hintzman (1969)
found that judged frequency increased with
the log of the true frequency. Still other
studies have suggested some cognitive pro-
cesses that could lead to even more serious
errors in judgments of lethal events. In this
regard, Postman (1964) noted that fre-
quency learning is typically incidental learn-
ing, which is strongly influenced by selective
attention. Estes (1976) observed that ac-
curate learning of frequencies requires the
learner to "attend to and encode occur-
rences of all the alternative events with
equal uniformity or efficiency" (p. 53).
Underwood (1969) found that items were
judged more frequent under conditions of
distributed rather than massed practice, and
Hintzman (1977) discussed a great deal of
evidence showing that apparent frequency
of an item increases with greater spacing
between its repetitions in a list. Any of these
factors could bias judgments about the fre-
quencies of causes of death. Events that
capture our attention and "stick in our
mind," like homicide, may appear more
frequent than they are. Rare events may
be overestimated because their appearances
are well spread and distinct. Catastrophic
(multifatality) events may be overesti-
mated because of their salience or under-
estimated because of massed presentation.
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) have
argued that people judge the probability or
frequency of an event by the ease with
which relevant instances can be retrieved
from memory or imagined. Reliance on
memorability and imaginability as a cue for
frequency is called the "availability" heuris-
tic. In the context of lethal events, the con-
cept of availability suggests that one's judg-
ments will be influenced not only by direct
experience with death and indirect exposure
via movies, books, television, newspapers,
and the like, but also by memorable char-
acteristics of the different causes of death,
such as sensationalism or vividness. Thus
we might expect that the frequencies of dra-
matic events such as cancer, homicide, or
multiple-death catastrophes, which tend to
be publicized disproportionately, would be
overestimated, while the frequencies of
"quiet killers" would be underestimated.
In summary, experimental research shows
that although people are very good at track-
ing event frequencies, the potential exists
JUDGED FREQUENCY OF LETHAL EVENTS 553
for serious misjudgment. Even without the
ambiguity of this conclusion, the implica-
tions of these laboratory studies for judg-
ments regarding causes of death would be
unclear. Lethal events are emotion-laden
stimuli experienced idiosyncratically over
the course of a lifetime. Any one person has
direct experience with only a few of these
events; knowledge about the other events
is gained indirectly, from a wide variety of
sources. Some of these events occur thou-
sands of times more frequently than others.
No laboratory experiments have even ap-
proximated these conditions.
Perhaps more relevant are field surveys
by several geographers (Burton, Kates, &
White, 1978; Kates, 1978; White, 1974;
Kates, Note 1). These studies have indi-
cated that (a) people misjudge the haz-
ards posed by floods, earthquakes, hurri-
canes, and drought; (b) more frequent
hazards are estimated more accurately; and
(c) accuracy is increased by both the re-
cency of the hazard's last major occurrence
and its impact on one's livelihood.
Judgments concerning the probabilities
and frequencies of real-life events have also
been studied by Selvidge (1972). In one
phase of her research, five subjects first
ranked several sets of accidents and crimes
according to frequency and then estimated
the absolute frequencies. Although her sub-
jects were fairly good at ordering the
events, they did a poor job of assigning ab-
solute frequencies. She also found a great
amount of variability across subjects, event
categories, and response modes. This varia-
bility and her small sample size led Selvidge
to advocate that these issues be investigated
on a much larger scale. The present study
does this.
Five experiments are reported here. The
first two examine the accuracy of compara-
tive judgments, using a paired-comparison
format. The third evaluates judgments of
absolute frequency. The fourth examines
the role that several aspects of availability
may play in determining such judgments.
The fifth explores the degree to which sub-
jects can overcome their errors when in-
formed of the nature of their biases.
Table 1
Master List of Causes of Death
Cause Rate/108
Smallpox 0
Poisoning by vitamins .5
Botulism 1
Measles 2.4
Fireworks 3
Smallpox vaccination 4
Whooping cough 7.2
Polio 8.3
Venomous bite or sting 23.5
Tornado 44
Lightning 52
Nonvenomous animal 63
Flood 100
Excess cold 163
Syphilis 200
Pregnancy, childbirth,
and abortion 220
Infectious hepatitis 330
Appendicitis 440
Electrocution 500
Motor vehicle—train collision 740
Asthma 920
Firearm accident 1,100
Poisoning by solid or liquid 1,250
Tuberculosis 1,800
Fire and flames 3,600
Drowning 3,600
Leukemia 7,100
Accidental falls 8,500
Homicide 9,200
Emphysema 10,600
Suicide 12,000
Breast cancer 15,200
Diabetes 19,000
Motor vehicles (car, truck,
or bus) accidents 27,000
Lung cancer 37,000
Cancer of the digestive system 46,600
All accidents 55,000
Stroke 102,000
AH cancer 160,000
Heart disease 360,000
All disease 849,000
Experiment 1: Paired-Comparison
Judgments of Lethal Events
The first experiment investigated the ac-
curacy of relative-frequency judgments for
various causes of death.
Method
Stimuli. Table 1 shows the stimulus events,
41 causes of death, and gives, for each item, the
frequency of death per 10s United States residents
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per year, based on reports prepared by the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics for the years
1968-1973.1 These events were chosen to repre-
sent the range of frequencies of causes of death for
which yearly statistics are available. Obscure or
unfamiliar causes were excluded, as were causes
showing large fluctuations from year to year. For
the few chosen events that showed a systematic
trend across years (e.g., homicide, which in-
creased from 7,300 per 10e in 1968 to 9,400 per
10s in 1973), the average over the last 2 years
was used.
From these 41 causes of death, 106 pairs were
constructed such that (a) each cause appeared in
approximately six pairs and (b) the ratios of
relative frequencies (comparing the more to the
less frequent cause of death) varied systematically
from 1.25:1 (example: fireworks vs. measles) to
about 100,000:1 (example: stroke vs. botulism).
Five pairs included smallpox as the less frequent
cause of death. Since no one in the United States
has died of smallpox since 1949, the rate shown
in Table 1 is zero, and no ratio comparing any
other disease with smallpox can be denned. In
the results that follow, all analyses employing ra-
tios of true frequencies (called true ratios) ex-
clude the five pairs involving smallpox.
Subjects. Two groups of subjects participated.
The first, hereafter referred to as the college
students, consisted of 51 males and 60 females who
answered an ad in the University of Oregon cam-
pus newspaper. The second consisted of 77 female
members of the Eugene, Oregon chapter of the
League of Women Voters, a group representative
of the best-informed citizens in the community.
All subjects were paid for participating. The data
were collected from the students in the autumn
of 1974 and from the league members in the spring
of 1975.
The order of the 106 pairs and of the two
causes within each pair was determined ran-
domly. All subjects saw the same random order.
Instructions. The subjects' instructions read as
follows:
Each item in part one consists of two different
possible causes of death. The question you are
to answer is: Which cause of death is more
likely? We do not mean more likely for you,
we mean more likely in general, in the United
States.
Consider all the people now living in the United
States—children, adults, everyone. Now suppos-
ing we randomly picked just one of those peo-
ple. Will that person more likely die next year
from cause A or cause B ? For example: Dying
in a bicycle accident versus dying from an over-
dose of heroin. Death from each cause is re-
motely possible. Our question is, which of these
two is the more likely cause of death?
For each pair of possible causes of death, A
and B, we want you to mark on your answer
sheet which cause you think is MORE LIKELY.
Next, we want you to decide how many times
more likely this cause of death is, as com-
pared with the other cause of death given in
the same item. The pairs we use vary widely
in their relative likelihood. For one pair, you
may think that the two causes are equally likely.
If so, you should write the number 1 in the
space provided for that pair. Or, you may think
that one cause of death is 10 times, or 100
times, or even a million times as likely as the
other cause of death. You have to decide: How
many times as likely is the more likely cause
of death? Write the number in the space pro-
vided. If you think it's twice as likely, write 2.
If it's 10 thousand times as likely, write 10,000,
and so forth.
In the instructions and at the top of the answer
sheet we drew a logarithmic scale labeled with
both numbers and words for all powers of 10 from
1 to 1,000,000. The scale ended in an arrow to in-
dicate that the scale continued. The instructions
continued:
The scale is there to give you an idea of the
kinds of numbers you might want to use. You
don't have to use exactly those numbers. You
could write 75 if you think that the more likely
cause of death is 75 times more likely than
the other cause, or 500, if you think that the
more likely cause of death is 500 times more
likely than the other.
For some pairs, you may believe that one cause
of death is just a little bit more likely than
the other cause of death. For this situation, you
will have to use a decimal point in your answer:
1.1 means that the more likely cause is 10%
more likely than the other cause.
1.2 means 20% more likely.
1.5 means 50% more likely, or half again as
likely.
1.8 means 80% more likely.
2 means twice as likely, which is the same as
100% more likely.
2.5 means two and a half times as likely.
In addition, the following glossary was provided
to insure that the subjects understood what was
included in some possibly ambiguous categories:
All accidents: includes any kind of accidental
event; excludes diseases and natural disasters
(floods, tornadoes, etc.).
All cancer: includes leukemia.
Cancer of the digestive system: includes cancer
of stomach, alimentary tract, esophagus, and in-
testines.
1
 For convenience, these frequencies are referred
to in this article as the true frequencies, although
we recognize that they are statistical estimates.
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Excess cold: freezing to death or death by ex-
posure.
Nonvenomous animal: dogs, bears, etc.
Venomous bite or sting: caused by snakes, bees,
wasps, etc.
Results
Accuracy. Two measures were computed
for each pair of causes of death: the per-
centage of subjects who correctly selected
the more likely item and the geometric
mean of the subjects' ratio judgments. For
any subject who did not correctly select
the more likely cause of death, the inverse
of the judged ratio was used in calculating
the geometric mean. For example, death by
fireworks is more frequent than death from
measles. If a subject said measles was 5
times more likely to cause death than fire-
works, the inverse, .2, was used. The two
summary measures, percentage correct and
the geometric mean of the ratio judgments,
are shown for all 106 pairs for both groups
of subjects in Table 2.
Examination of Table 2 illustrates the
many, often severe, misconceptions held by
both the college students and the league
members. For example, even though stroke
causes 85% more deaths than all accidents
combined (pair 37, true ratio = 1.85), only
20% of the students and 23% of the league
members judged stroke to be more likely.
The geometric mean of the ratio judgments
was only .04 for the students, indicating that
on the average, they believed that accidents
were 25 times (1 •*• .04) more frequent.
Tornadoes were seen by the student sub-
jects as more frequent killers than asthma,
even though the latter is 20 times more likely
(pair 61). Death by lightning was judged
less likely than death by botulism even
though it is 52 times more frequent (pair
71). Death by asthma was judged only
slightly more frequent than death by botu-
lism (pair 91), even though it is over 900
times more frequent! Accidental deaths
were reported by the students to be about
as likely as death from disease despite a true
ratio of 15.4 for diseases over accidents
(pair 69).
Some errors were in the opposite direc-
tion: A large percentage of subjects knew
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Figure 2. Percentage of student subjects who cor-
rectly identified the more likely cause of death as
a function of true ratio for 101 paired causes of
death.
which cause of death was more likely, but
the ratios given were far too large. For ex-
ample, death by a motor vehicle accident is
only 1.4 times more likely than death from
diabetes (pair 25), not 356
 r;times more
likely (the students' geometric mean) or
100 times more likely (league members).
Subjects' ability to detect the more likely
event was not quite as bad as these exam-
ples suggest. They were generally able to
identify the more frequent cause of death
when the true ratio was 2:1 or greater.
Below 2:1, however, discrimination was
often poor, as shown in Figures 2 and 3,
which compare the percentage of correct
discriminations with the log true ratio for
the two groups of subjects (101 pairs, ex-
cluding smallpox).
Accuracy as measured by percentage cor-
rect was slightly higher for events with
greater true frequency. The partial corre-
lation between percentage correct and log
frequency of the less likely event, holding
true ratio constant, was .24 (z = 2.48, one-
tailed p < .01) for the college students and
.19 («= 1.62, one-tailed p < .06) for the
league members. Since greater true fre-
quency typically implies greater exposure,
these are surprisingly low correlations. They
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Table 2
Results of Paired-Comparison Judgments for Causes of Death
Pair
no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
Less likely
Smallpox
Smallpox
Smallpox
Smallpox
Smallpox
Measles
Fireworks
Lightning
Excess cold
Asthma
Leukemia
Accidental falls
Homicide
Breast cancer
Lung cancer
Stomach cancer
Tornado
Flood
Hepatitis
Electrocution
Poisoning
Leukemia
Accidental falls
Suicide
Diabetes
Lung cancer
Stroke
Poisoning by vitamins
Lightning
Flood
Pregnancy, etc.
Appendicitis
Tuberculosis
Tuberculosis
Leukemia* ''
Breast cssffer
All accidents
All cancer
Poisoning by vitamins
Polio
Nonvenomous animal
Syphilis
Pregnancy, etc.
Motor-train collision
Motor-train collision
Tuberculosis
Emphysema
Diabetes
Measles
Smallpox vaccination
Venomous bite/sting
Lightning
Hepatitis
Hepatitis
Poisoning
Tuberculosis
Emphysema
Lung cancer
Measles
Polio
Tornado
Nonvenomous animal
Hepatitis
Appendicitis
Motor-train collision
Poisoning
Tuberculosis
Diabetes
All accidents
Poisoning by vitamins
Botulism
Whooping cough
Venomous bite/sting
More likely
Botulism
Measles
Smallpox vaccination
Polio
Heart disease
Fireworks
Smallpox vaccination
Nonvenomous animal
Syphilis
Firearm accident
Accidental falls
Emphysema
Suicide
Diabetes
Stomach cancer
All accidents
Nonvenomous animal
Excess cold
Electrocution
Motor-train collision
Tuberculosis
Emphysema
Suicide
Diabetes
Motor vehicle accident
All accidents
All cancer
Botulism
Flood
Syphilis
Appendicitis
Asthma
Fire and flames
Drowning
Breast cancer
Lung cancer
Stroke
Heart disease
Measles
Tornado
Hepatitis
Firearm accident
Firearm accident
Fire and flames
Drowning
Homicide
All accidents
Stroke
Venomous bite/sting
Tornado
Pregnancy, etc.
Electrocution
Fire and flames
Drowning
Suicide
Diabetes
Stroke
Heart disease
Tornado
Excess cold
Asthma
Poisoning
Leukemia
Homicide
Breast cancer
Motor vehicle accident
Lung cancer
Heart diasese
All diseases
Venomous bite /sting
Lightning
Hepatitis
Firearm accident
Rate of
less
likely
0
0
0
0
0
2.4
3
52
163
920
7,100
8,500
9,200
15,200
37,000
46,600
44
100
330
500
1,250
7,100
8,500
12,000
19,000
37,000
102,000
.5
52
100
220
440
1,800
1,800
7,100
15,200
55,000
160,000
.5
8.3
63
200
220
740
740
1,800
10,600
19,000
2.4
4
23.5
52
330
330
1,250
1,800
10,600
37,000
2.4
8.3
44
63
330
440
740
1,250
1,800
19,000
55,000
.5
1
7.2
23.5
True
ratio
—
—
—
—
1.25
1.33
1.21
1.23
1.20
1.20
1.25
1.30
1.25
1.25
1.19
1.43
1.63
1.52
1.48
1.44
1.49
1.41
1.58
1.42
1.49
1.57
2.00
1.92
2.00
2.00
2.09
2.00
2.00
2.14
2.43
1.85
2.25
4.80
5.30
5.24
5.50
5.00
4.86
4.86
5.11
5.19
5.37
9.79
11.00
9.36
9.62
10.90
10.90
9.60
10.56
9.62
9.73
18.3
19.6
20.9
19.8
21.5
20.9
20.5
21.6
20.6
18.9
15.4
47.0
52.0
45.8
46.8
% correct
Students
77
60
26
64
97
28
36
55
72
80
46
41
32
23
25
90
20
37
45
45
26
47
58
25
99
81
83
68
85
57
17
50
81
67
58
82
20
55
66
71
84
66
62
67
67
91
88
91
65
84
77
88
67
68
70
53
81
81
68
63
42
95
75
91
70
95
85
97
57
75
37
88
85
LWV
88
86
56
74
97
35
29
58
81
78
64
39
30
27
44
87
21
32
38
52
12
47
51
31
96
90
75
82
87
73
10
71
92
83
60
71
23
68
74
86
90
77
68
90
77
91
95
84
68
91
82
92
78
71
73
90
74
95
70
79
68
95
79
97
83
94
99
97
79
79
45
91
87
Geometric mean
Students
5.54
1.52
.08
2.78
1,130.0
.27
.47
.71
5.93
11.0
.78
.65
.19
.13
.31
28.1
.10
.51
.61
1.16
.19
.58
1.58
.09
356.0
11.1
21.0
4.08
18.6
1.74
.10
1.00
10.5
2.98
1.48
6.42
.04
.89
2.50
4.26
9.76
4.38
2.14
2.45
1.97
25.2
269
29.3
1.68
16.8
7.27
23.1
4.22
4.55
5.50
1.47
10.5
3.71
5.63
1.64
.36
17.1
12.5
72.7
4.90
388
23.3
127
1.62
4.04
.30
7.66
9.94
LWV
18.3
16.0
1.08
5.90
13,263
.44
.29
1.89
23.7
14.1
2.45
.45
.14
.14
.81
29.4
.15
.34
.44
2.40
.03
1.02
.64
.20
99.6
34.7
8.20
14.0
14.1
6.60
.07
6.65
38.9
19.3
2.98
2.74
.13
1.88
5.45
18.0
15.1
16.6
6.66
14.2
7.17
72.9
107
46.6
3.11
22.7
11.6
26.6
11.2
7.80
2.59
14.7
10.2
24.4
4.67
6.05
3.53
64.9
14.7
105
20.9
304
145
206
11.6
16.5
.32
12.4
35.7
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Table 2 (continued)
Pair
no.
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
Less likely
Venomous bite/sting
Syphilis
Pregnancy, etc.
Electrocution
Asthma
Leukemia
Poisoning by vitamins
Measles
Whooping cough
Flood
Excess cold
Syphilis
Appendicitis
Drowning
Fire and flames
Accidental falls
Poisoning by vitamins
Botulism
Botulism
Whooping cough
Polio
Flood
Excess cold
Botulism
Measles
Fireworks
Polio
Tornado
Nonvenomous animal
Poisoning by vitamins
Botulism
Fireworks
Smallpox vaccination
More likely
Poisoning
Homicide
Suicide
Motor vehicle accident
Stomach cancer
Heart disease
Lightning
Pregnancy, etc.
Motor-train collision
Homicide
Breast cancer
Diabetes
Stomach cancer
Heart disease
Heart disease
All disease
Electrocution
Asthma
Firearm accident
Leukemia
Accidental falls
Stroke
AH cancer
Emphysema
Motor vehicle accident
Motor vehicle accident
Stroke
Heart disease
All disease
Stomach cancer
Stroke
Heart disease
Heart disease
Rate of
less
likely
23.5
200
220
500
920
7,100
.5
2.4
7.2
100
163
200
440
3,600
3,600
8,500
.5
1
1
7.2
8.3
100
163
1
2.4
3
8.3
44
63
.5
1
3
4
True
ratio
53.2
46.0
54.5
54.0
50.4
50.7
104
92
103
92
93
94
105
100
100
100
1,000
920
1,100
983
1,024
1,020
982
10,600
11,250
9,000
12,289
8.182
13,476
92,800
102,000
120,000
90,000
% correct
Students
78
86
81
97
86
90
50
84
85
91
80
64
89
92
93
91
85
59
88
94
93
89
95
86
96
95
95
95
98
92
96
96
99
LWV
83
82
79
99
90
99
61
79
95
94
95
71
95
95
94
90
86
75
94
99
95
90
99
94
99
97
99
97
100
99
95
99
100
Geometric mean
Students
5.21
31.7
14.8
539
36.4
33.8
1.45
13.4
15.2
81.7
26.7
2.36
30.2
56.9
79.7
324
30.7
1.50
29.9
45.2
17.5
43.4
1,490
24
1,070
1,430
164
348
5,600
103
106
1,530
3,610
LWV
11.3
44.2
12.7
909
43.4
184
2.00
9.44
70.1
294
255
4.52
83.7
272
252
614
27.7
9.29
189
166
198
186
4,337
190
2,765
5,268
2,265
2,396
33,521
578
468
5,779
12,244
Note. LWV = subjects who were members of the League of Women Voters.
reflect the fact that our subjects were not
much better at judging the relative fre-
quency of death from high-frequency pairs
such as all cancer versus heart disease (pair
38) than they were at judging low-fre-
quency pairs such as poisoning by vitamins
versus botulism (pair 28).
The geometric means of the likelihood
judgments were only moderately related to
the true ratios of frequencies, as shown in
Figures 4 and 5 (101 pairs, excluding
^smallpox). For example, the college stu-
dents produced mean ratios in the range of
100:1 to 500:1 for pairs with true ratios
as small as 1.5:1 and as large as 100,000:
1! Conversely, pairs having true ratios of
about 2:1 had geometric mean judgments
ranging from 25:1 in the wrong direction
to over 300:1 in the right direction! The
geometric means were somewhat more ac-
curate for the league members but still
were far from optimal. The correlation be-
tween log geometric mean judged ratio and
log true ratio was .69 for the students and
,75 for the league members. The regression
lines (shown as dashed lines in Figures 4
and 5) were both too flat.
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Figure 3. Percentage of League of Women Voters
who correctly identified the more likely cause of
death as a function of true ratio for 101 paired
causes of death.
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Figure 4. Geometric means of student subjects'
ratio judgments as a function of true ratio for 101
paired causes of death.
Secondary bias. The regression lines
shown in Figures 4 and 5 capture what we
will call primary bias: a tendency to under-
estimate large ratios. In addition, the data
showed a secondary bias: Different pairs
with the same ratio had quite different
judged ratios. One measure of this second-
ary bias is the signed difference between
the log geometric mean for a pair and its
log geometric mean as predicted by the re-
gression equation. (This measure is equiva-
lent to the vertical distance between a point
in Figure 4 or 5 and the dashed regression
line.) A positive value indicates that the
ratio judgments for that pair were large
relative to the general relationship between
the judged ratio and the true ratio. A nega-
tive value indicates relative underestimation
or estimation in the wrong direction. As
measured by these residual values, second-
ary bias was highly consistent across the
two groups of subjects: The between-
groups correlation of the residuals was .90
(over 101 pairs). Further analysis of sec-
ondary bias will be presented later in the
article.
Consistency. Even though they were
often inaccurate, subjects' mean responses
revealed a consistent subjective ordering for
the causes of death. There were 18 triads
(involving 29 of the 41 causes of death)
of the form A vs. B, B vs. C, A vs. C within
the 106 pairs (for example, all accidents
paired with stroke, stroke paired with em-
physema, and emphysema paired with all
accidents). For such triads, we asked Were
the choice percentages transitive? and Were
the geometric means consistent? The an-
swer to both these questions was yes for
the triad described above. Eighty percent
of the students said all accidents were more
likely than stroke (geometric mean likeli-
hood ratio = 26.3), 81% said stroke was
more likely than emphysema (geom. mean
likelihood ratio = 10.5), and 88% said all
accidents were more likely than emphysema
(geom. mean likelihood ratio = 269). These
data exhibit strong stochastic transitivity,2
in that the percentage of subjects judging
all accidents more likely than emphysema
was the largest of the three percentages.
The consistency of the geometric means is
shown by the similarity of the third mean
(269) to the product of the first two means
(276). Thus, the group showed a clear sub-
jective ordering: emphysema < stroke < all
accidents. The true order, however, is em-
physema < all accidents < stroke. These
results are typical of all 36 triads analyzed
(18 triads each for college students and
league members). The choice percentages
exhibited weak stochastic transitivity for
every triad; strong stochastic transitivity
was satisfied for 27 out of 36 triads.
The consistency of the ratio judgments
was measured by comparing the log of the
geometric mean ratio for pair A:C in each
2
 Three levels of stochastic transitivity may be
distinguished (cf. Coombs, Dawes, & Tversky,
1970, p. 156). For any three stimuli, x, y, and z,
assume that p ( x , y) ^ 1/2 (i.e., that the propor-
tion choosing x over y is greater than or equal
to .5) and lhat p(y, s) S 1/2. Then strong sto-
chastic transitivity requires that p(x, z) i max
[p(x, y } , p(y, s ) } , moderate stochastic transi-
tivity requires that p(x, z) ;> min [p(x, y),
P(y, *) ]> while weak stochastic transitivity re-
quires only that p(x, z} > 1/2.
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triad with the log of the product of the geo-
metric mean ratios for A: B and B: C. The
relationship was linear with r — .99 (slope
= 1.10; antilog of intercept = .83) for the
college students and r = .97 (slope = 1.05;
antilog of intercept = 1.09) for the league
members. These results suggest that as a
group, these subjects exhibited an interval
scale of subjective frequency.
Between-groups comparisons. The re-
sponses of the students and the league mem-
bers were highly similar. Across all 106
pairs, the correlation between the two
groups was .93 for both percentage correct
and geometric mean judged ratio. The high
correlation between the two groups' second-
ary bias residuals is further evidence of this
similarity. The league members had a some-
what higher percentage correct than the stu-
dents (M — 76.8 vs. 71.3); their percentage
correct was higher for 80 pairs, equal for 5
pairs, and lower for 21 pairs (sign test;
p < .001). For the ratio judgments, how-
ever, the league members did not perform
significantly better than the students; the
geometric mean of their ratio judgments
was closer to the true ratio for only 62 of
the 106 pairs (sign test; z = 1.65, p > .10).
Individual performance. The perform-
ance of individual subjects was rather vari-
able. Percent correct ranged between 56%
and 84% for the students and between 60%
and 89% for the league members. Analysis
of the correlations between log judged ratio
and log true ratio over 101 items indicated
that few individuals showed any appreciable
ability to perform the ratio-estimation task.
These correlations ranged between —.11
and .72 (Mdn = .45) for students and be-
tween .10 and .80 (Mdn — .51) for league
members.
Further insight into the level of individual
subjects' performance was obtained by cal-
culating an error ratio, defined as the ratio
of the judgment to the truth, or vice versa,
whichever was greater than 1. A subject
who always gave a judged ratio off by a
factor of 10, that is, either 10 times as large
or a tenth as large as the true ratio, would
have a mean error ratio of 10. The median
student subject erred by a factor of 22.5
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Figure 5. Geometric means of League of Women
Voters subjects' ratio judgments as a function of
true ratio for 101 paired causes of death.
(range = 7-556), while the median league
member erred, on the average, by a factor of
17.6 (range = 5-2,693).
An analysis of transitive triads was also
done separately for each subject. The me-
dian number of transitive triads (out of 18)
was 17 for each group. Only 27% of the
subjects in both groups showed more than
one intransitivity, while 44% (students)
and 49% (league members) were always
transitive. Thus, the strong internal con-
sistency found in the group means was also
found in the judgments of individuals.
Experiment 2: Paired-Comparison
Judgments of Words and Occupations
In order to test whether the primary re-
sults of Experiment 1 were unique to the
set of stimuli used, Experiment 1 was re-
peated using pairs of words and pairs of
occupations as stimuli.
Method
Stimuli. The list of words studied is shown
in Table 3, along with their frequency of occur-
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rence per 10° words of English text. These fre-
quencies represent an average from two separate
sources. One source, the Lorge magazine count
(Thorndike & Lorge, 1944), analyzed frequencies
from a sample of about a million words from each
of five major magazines between the years 1927
and 1938. The second source (Kucera & Francis,
1967) analyzed 500 samples of about 200 words
each, taken from a wide variety of materials,
ranging from newspapers to scientific journals and
from popular romantic fiction to abstruse philo-
sophical discussions. For the words in Table 3, the
frequencies estimated by the two sources agreed
closely. From this list, 100 pairs of words were
selected, with true ratios ranging from 1.10 (of
vs. to) to 6,126 (the vs. cork).
The list of occupations studied is shown in
Table 4, along with their frequency of occurrence
among 10" employed U.S. civilian citizens. These
frequencies were derived from a report compiled
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1972). From
the list, 95 pairs were selected, with true ratios
ranging from 1.15 (garbage collector vs. uphols-
terer) to 1,229 (registered nurse vs. lay mid-
wife).
Subjects and instructions. The subjects were
college students recruited via a campus news-
Table 3
Master List of Words
Word
the
of
and
to
in
that
he
for
with
on
from
when
out
time
two
after
people
again
once
next
half
result
music
couple
hit
proud
dull
tent
cork
jug
bun
Rate/106
61,260
34,716
29,834
25,892
19,032
11,483
10,246
9,118
7,300
6,730
4,044
2,807
2,565
1,751
1,368
1,152
821
730
578
455
358
222
182
125
104
70
46
26
10
7
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Figure 6. Percentage of subjects who correctly
identified the more likely cause of death as a func-
tion of true ratio for 100 pairs of words.
paper advertisement and paid for their participa-
tion. A group of 111 subjects judged the word
pairs, and a different group of 118 individuals
judged occupations. The instructions for words
and occupations paralleled those for causes of
death. For pairs of words, the subjects were
asked to judge which word is more likely to be
sampled at random from common writing (maga-
zines and books, fiction, nonfiction, scientific, non-
scientific, etc.) in the United States, and to indi-
cate how many times more likely the more fre-
quent word is than the other word in the pair.
For occupations, subjects were asked to indicate
whether an employed U.S. citizen picked at ran-
dom is more likely to be working as an A or a
B, and how many times more likely the more
frequent occupation is than the other occupation
in the pair.
Results
Accuracy. Figures 6 and 7 show the re-
lationship between percentage correct and
true ratio, and geometric mean ratio judg-
ments are plotted against true ratio in Fig-
ures 8 and 9.s
For true ratios of 5:1 or greater, per-
centage correct was considerably higher for
s
 The tables on which these figures are based
may be obtained from the authors.
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words than for occupations; below 5:1 there
was no difference. For true ratios larger
than 2:1, both words and occupations were
more accurately discriminated than were
causes of death (compare Figures 6 and 7
with Figure 2). For true ratios <2:1,
there were again numerous errors of dis-
crimination.
Geometric mean judged ratios for words
and occupations were considerably closer to
the corresponding true ratios than were
judged ratios for causes of death, as may be
seen by comparing Figures 8 and 9 (words
and occupations) with Figure 4 (causes of
death). The correlation between judged and
true ratios was higher for words (.90) than
for occupations (.81), but since the scatter
about the regression line is not notably less,
this effect may be attributed to the greater
range of true ratios for words. As shown in
Figures 8 and 9, the slope of the regression
line for occupations was somewhat flat, but
words showed a slope near unity, which,
taken with the intercept of 1.95, indicated a
systematic tendency toward overestimation.4
Consistency. The consistency of subjec-
Table 4
Master List of Occupations
O
o
100
90'
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
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Figure 7. Percentage of subjects who correctly
identified the more likely cause of death as a func-
tion of true ratio for 95 pairs of occupations.
Occupation Rate/108
Secretary 3,529,680
Elementary or secondary school
teacher 3,155,206
Retail sales clerk 2,967,880
Truck driver 1,802,169
Waiter or waitress 1,331,616
Registered nurse 1,083,800
Auto mechanic 1,051,250
College or university teacher 635,138
Electrician 611,935
Telephone operator 531,655
Physician 436,322
Lawyer 339,829
Letter carrier 329,866
Bus driver 308,205
Bartender 246,584
Computer programmer 210,750
Librarian 159,172
Baker 142,634
Bulldozer operator 115,537
Garbage collector 93,290
Upholsterer 81,118
Architect 73,418
Dietitian 52,422
Airline purser, steward, or stewardess 43,891
Air traffic controller 33,040
Airline pilot or copilot 32,787
Psychiatrist 28,191
Veterinarian 25,387
Motion picture projectionist 20,198
Judge 16,001
FBI special agent 10,320
Rabbi 8,491
Embalmer 6,203
EEC technician 3,919
Jockey 2,065
Nuclear reactor operator 1,568
Lay midwife 882
tive ordering of the stimuli was sought by
analyzing the triads in the words and occu-
pations pairs. Of the 39 triads contained
in the words task, 28 showed strong sto-
chastic transitivity, 10 showed moderate
stochastic transitivity, and one was intransi-
tive. The one intransitive triad involved
three pairs for which consensus was lacking
* Carroll (1971), who elicited direct (magni-
tude) estimates of 60 words (12 of which were
used here), found a correlation of .92 between
assessed and actual values. His regression line
had a slope of .58.
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Figure 8. Geometric means of subjects' ratio judg-
ments as a function of true ratio for 100 pairs of
words.
(57% of subjects thought in was more
likely than that; 56%, that more likely than
for; and 51%, for more likely than in). Of
the 20 triads contained in the occupations
task, 17 showed strong stochastic transitiv-
ity, and 3 showed moderate stochastic
transitivity.
The log geometric mean ratio response
to the third pair of each triad was corre-
lated with the log of the product of the re-
sponses of the other two pairs; these cor-
relations were .94 for words (slope = 1.21,
antilog of intercept = .80) and .76 for oc-
cupations (slope = .64, antilog of intercept
= 5.32). Thus, words and occupations
judgments showed considerable internal
consistency, as found with causes of death.
Comparison with Experiment 1. The
purpose of Experiment 2 was to find out
whether the major findings of Experiment
1 were specific to lethal events. Three re-
sults of this comparison are noteworthy.
First, subjects responded more accurately
to words than to occupations; causes of
death were worse yet. This may be due to
exposure: We experience many more sam-
ples of English text each day than examples
of people working in occupations, and our
exposure to death is even more limited.
Another possible reason for poorer per-
formance with causes of death is that our
exposure to these events is systematically
biased. We shall discuss this bias later in
the article.
Second, we found that causes-of-death
subjects tended to underestimate ratios
larger than 50:1. Underestimation did not
appear at all with words and was found
with occupations only for ratios of 1,000:1.
Thus, one cannot conclude that the primary
bias found in Experiment 1 was simply due
to difficulties in using large numbers rather
than to insufficient discrimination between
different causes of death.
Third, we found strong evidence in these
new tasks that subjects possess consistent
subjective frequency scales for these con-
tent areas, as they did for causes of death.
Experiment 3: Direct Estimates
of Event Frequencies
Experiment 1 suggested that subjects
have a consistent underlying scale for the
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Figure 9. Geometric means of subjects' ratio judg-
ments as a function of true ratio for 95 pairs of
occupations.
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frequency of lethal events, although that
scale deviates markedly from the statisti-
cally correct one. Unfortunately, the incom-
plete paired-comparison design used in Ex-
periment 1 did not permit the subjective
scale to be uncovered for all events. When
the judged relative frequencies for a given
pair were in error, it was difficult to deter-
mine whether judgments were biased for
one, the other, or both members of the pair.
Experiment 3 elicited direct estimates to
clarify the nature of the biases for individual
lethal events.
Method
The subjects were 74 respondents to an adver-
tisement in the University of Oregon campus
newspaper. Each subject was assigned to one of
two groups. One group of 40 subjects was told
that the frequency of deaths in the U.S. due to
motor vehicle accidents was 50,000 per year
(MVA group). Using this value as a standard,
they were asked to estimate the frequency for the
other 40 lethal events shown in Table 1. The re-
maining 34 subjects (Group E) were given the
standard of 1,000 deaths by electrocution. The
glossary used in Experiment 1, which defined
some of the events, was provided. The 41 events
were listed in alphabetical order on a single sheet.
Subjects were encouraged to erase and change
answers to make the relative frequencies of the
entire set consistent with their best opinions.
Since there were about 205,000,000 persons in
the United States when the data were collected,
the rates per 108 shown in Table 1 were multi-
plied by 2.05 to provide statistical frequencies
against which to compare subjects' judgments.
The standards given to the subjects, 1,000 for
electrocutions and 50,000 for motor vehicle acci-
dents, were close to these computed statistical
frequencies (1,025 and 55,350, respectively).
Results
The data for one subject from Group
MVA and two subjects from Group E were
excluded from all analyses because they
gave unreasonably high estimates (the sum
of their estimates for all 41 causes of death
exceeded 50,000,000, whereas the sum of
the statistical frequencies is 3,553,004). An-
other subject was excluded from Group E
because of unusually low responses. All of
this subject's responses were below 1,000
(the value of the standard); 38 of 40 re-
sponses were less than 100. As a result of
these exclusions, the data presented below
are based on 39 subjects in Group MVA
and 31 subjects in Group E.
Because arithmetic means tend to be un-
duly influenced by occasional extreme val-
ues, the present results are based on the
geometric means of the estimates. The use
of medians leads to essentially the same re-
sults. For both groups, the correlation be-
tween log geometric mean and log median
was .99 (for Group MVA, slope = 1.01,
antilog of intercept = .97; for Group E,
slope = 1.00, antilog of intercept = 1.17).
The log geometric mean direct estimates
for Groups E and MVA were highly cor-
related (r=.98). However, as shown in
Table 5, the geometric means for the MVA
group were larger than those for Group E
for 34 of 41 causes (sign test; p < .01).
This difference may be due to MVA sub-
jects anchoring on a larger standard than
that presented to E subjects. (The two col-
umns in Table 5 labeled ratio of fudged to
predicted will be discussed later in the
article.)
Accuracy. Figures 10 and 11 show the
geometric mean judgments plotted against
the true rates (excluding smallpox). The
best-fitting quadratic curves are also shown.
For both groups, quadratic equations pro-
vided a significantly better fit (p < .01) to
the data than linear equations. For the
MVA group, the correlation between the
log geometric mean responses and the pre-
dictions from the quadratic equation was
.92; the linear correlation was .89. For
Group E the correlations were .93 (qua-
dratic) and .91 (linear).
Although the log geometric mean esti-
mates correlated highly with the true fre-
quency, these correlations, calculated over
a true frequency range of over 800,000, do
not indicate substantial accuracy. Large es-
timation errors were evident, as with the
paired-comparison judgments. For exam-
ple, as Table 5 indicates, accidental death
was again judged about equal in frequency
to all diseases (although death from disease
is 15 times more likely), cancer was judged
to be about twice as frequent as heart dis-
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Table 5
Results from Direct Estimates
MVA
Cause
Smallpox
Poisoning by vitamins
Botulism
Measles
Fireworks
Smallpox vaccination
Whooping cough
Polio
Venomous bite or sting
Tornado
Lightning
Nonvenomous animal
Flood
Excess cold
Syphilis
Pregnancy, childbirth, and abortion
Infectious hepatitis
Appendicitis
Electrocution
Motor-train collision
Asthma
Firearms
Poisoning
Tuberculosis
Fire and flames
Drowning
Leukemia
Accidental falls
Homicide
Emphysema
Suicide
Breast cancer
Diabetes
Motor vehicle accident
Lung cancer
Stomach cancer
All accidents
Stroke
All cancer
Heart disease
All disease
Rate per
2.05 X 10s
0
1
2
5
6
8
IS
17
48
90
107
129
205
334
410
451
677
902
1,025
1,517
1,886
2,255
2,563
3,690
7,380
7,380
14,555
17,425
18,860
21,730
24,600
31,160
38,950
55,350
75,850
95,120
112,750
209,100
328,000
738,000
1,740,450
Geometric
mean
88
237
379
331
331
38
171
202
535
688
128
298
863
468
717
1,932
907
880
586
793
769
1,623
1,318
966
3,814
1,989
2,807
2,585
8,441
3,009
6,675
3,607
2,138
50,000"
9,723
4,878
86,537
10,668
47,523
25,900
80,779
Ratio of
judged to
predicted
1.27
1.97
1.39
1.54
.17
.69
.80
1.67
1.82
.32
.71
1.77
.81
1.15
2.98
1.19
1.03
.65
.74
.65
1.26
.96
.59
1.62
.85
.81
.68
2.10
.69
1.42
.66
.34
6.34
1.00
.43
6.77
.54
1.70
.49
.75
Electrocution
Geometric
mean
37
44
88
85
77
14
51
47
233
463
64
102
627
211
338
935
328
416
1,000»
598
333
1,114
778
448
2,918
1,425
2,220
2,768
3,691
2,696
3,280
2,436
1,019
33,884
9,806
2,209
91,285
4,737
43,772
21,503
97,701
Ratio of
judged to
predicted
1.16
1.96
1.47
1.26
.22
.62
.55
1.85
2.86
.37
.54
2.71
.73
1.05
2.78
.80
.87
1.96
.95
.47
1.42
.92
.43
1.86
.91
.92
1.03
1.30
.86
.97
.61
.22
5.76
1.33
.26
9.32
.31
2.00
.51
1.14
Note. MVA = motor vehicle accident.
* Standard.
ease (the reverse is true), floods were
estimated to take more lives than asthma
(asthma is 9 times more likely), diabetes
was seen as only half as frequent as fire and
flames, homicides were judged almost as
frequent as stroke and so on.
The errors evident in the direct estimates
were partitioned into primary and secondary
components, as was done with the paired-
comparison judgments in Experiment 1.
The primary bias was an overestimation of
low-frequency events and underestimation
of high-frequency events by both groups.
As shown by the quadratic curve in Figure
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Figure 10. Geometric means (GM) of ratio judgments by motor vehicle accident group sub-
jects as a. function of true frequency (TF). (Curved line is best-fitting quadratic: log GM =
.07 [log TFP + .03 log TF + 2.27.)
10, the crossover point for Group MVA
was at a true rate of about 800; all events
with frequencies lower than that were over-
estimated, and all above that point were
underestimated. For Group E (see Figure
11) the crossover point was less clear; it
occurred around a true rate of 250.
Secondary bias. Deviations from the re-
gression curves were quite similar for the
two groups (see Figures 10 and 11). The
correlation between the two groups' residual
values (i.e., the vertical distance between
each point and the regression curve) was
.91 across the 40 items (excluding small-
pox), indicating a consistent secondary bias
above and beyond the primary bias evi-
denced by the regression curves. The anti-
logs of these residuals are shown in Table
5, in the columns labeled ratio of judged to
predicted. Some of the items with large re-
siduals are labeled on the two figures. The
similarity between the two groups of sub-
jects, relative to their own regression lines,
is striking. Frequency of death due to all
accidents, motor vehicle accidents, preg-
nancy, flood, tornado, and cancer was rela-
tively overestimated by both groups. Death
due to smallpox vaccination, diabetes, light-
ning, heart disease, tuberculosis, and asthma
was relatively underestimated by both.
Comparison with Experiment 1. Over-
all, there is a close relationship between the
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Figure 11. Geometric means (GM) of ratio judgments by electrocution group subjects as a
function of true frequency (TF). (Curved line is best-fitting quadratic: log GM = .OS (log
TF)2 + .22 log TF + 1.58.)
direct estimates of the present experiment
and the paired-comparison results of Ex-
periment 1. From the geometric means of
the direct estimates one can compute ratios
for each of the 106 pairs studied in Experi-
ment 1. The logs of these derived ratios
were highly correlated with the logs of the
geometric mean frequency ratios from Ex-
periment 1 (college students) : r — .94 for
the MVA group and .93 for the E group
(across all 106 pairs).
Neither the judged ratios from Experi-
ment 1 nor the ratios derived from the
direct estimates of the present experiment
were consistently closer to the true ratios.
The judged ratios from Experiment 1 were
less accurate when the true ratio was low
(< 10:1) and more accurate when the true
ratio was high (;> 10:1).
Individual performance. For each sub-
ject the correlation between log response
and log true rate was calculated across the
40 stimuli (excluding smallpox). Individ-
uals in Group E showed a range from .61
to .92 and a median of .77. Within Group
MVA, correlations ranged from .28 to .90;
the median was .66. Again, these correla-
tions do not indicate substantial accuracy.
Subjects who could make only the roughest
discriminations, for example, knowing that
death from botulism or lightning is less
likely than death from all cancer or all acci-
JUDGED FREQUENCY OF LETHAL EVENTS 567
Table 6
Ratings on Eight Predictor Variables
Indirect
Cause
Smallpox
Poisoning by vitamins
Botulism
Measles
Fireworks
Smallpox vaccination
Whooping cough
Polio
Venomous bite or sting
Tornado
Lightning
Nonvenomous animal
Flood
Excess cold
Syphilis
Pregnancy, abortion,
and childbirth
Infectious hepatitis
Appendicitis
Electrocution
Motor-train collision
Asthma
Firearm accident
Poisoning solid/liquid
Tuberculosis
Fire and flames
Drowning
Leukemia
Accidental falls
Homicide
Emphysema
Suicide
Breast cancer
Diabetes
Motor vehicle accident
Lung cancer
Stomach cancer
All accidents
Stroke
All cancer
Heart disease
All disease
Range of scale
M
Death
2.20
1.23
2.82
2.07
2.43
1.30
1.48
2.49
2.41
3.46
2.34
2.30
3.66
2.62
2.51
3.07
2.03
2.00
2.90
3.03
1.62
3.89
3.02
2.71
4.07
3.82
3. 56
3.18
4.69
3.02
4.00
3.03
2.37
4.69
4.15
2.89
4.44
3.87
4.54
4.28
4.48
1-5
3.04
Suffer-
ing
2.48
1.43
2.82
3.00
2.85
1.71
1.95
2.87
2.97
3.75
2.38
2.89
4.05
2.93
3.67
3.84
2.77
2.67
2.69
2.85
3.13
3.87
3.05
3.13
4.15
3.23
3.38
3.54
4.33
3.36
3.66
4.33
3.49
4.71
4.21
3.08
4.64
3.98
4.59
4.34
4.49
1-5
3.35
Direct
Death
1.02
1.00
1.03
1.05
1.10
1.03
1.00
1.15
1.05
1.07
1.05
1.03
1.12
1.15
1.07
1.13
1.12
1.10
1.21
1.23
1.18
1.44
1.10
1.10
1.20
1.69
1.36
1.31
1.39
1.31
1.74
1.38
1.31
2.03
1.82
1.59
2.05
1.95
2.38
2.15
2.25
1-3
1.35
Suffer-
ing
1.33
1.07
1.36
2.41
1.56
1.41
1.38
1.77
2.15
1.38
1.23
1.82
1.56
1.57
1.79
2.03
2.02
2.30
1.57
1.28
2.41
1.67
1.61
1.61
1.71
1.68
1.23
2.43
1.23
1.75
1.71
2.00
2.39
2.61
1.66
1.59
2.43
2.18
2.34
2.10
2.44
1-3
1.80
News-
paper
fre-
quency
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
36
1
4
4
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
1
8
3
0
94
47
1
15
278
1
29
0
0
298
3
0
715
12
25
49
111
l-oo
42.4
News-
paper
inches
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
153.5
.8
33.8
41.8
0
0
0
0
0
42.2
0
1.9
28.2
17.9
0
320.7
247
14.8
124.8
5042.9
1.1
356.7
0
0
1440.5
35.9
0
2861.4
130.7
188.5
303.4
727.1
1-00
295.5
Catas-
trophe
1.35
1
1.49
1
1
1
1
1
1
4.51
1.01
1
5.57
1.20
1
1.01
1
1
1
2.12
1
1.02
1.03
1.08
1.73
1.07
1
1.03
1.06
1
1
1
1
1.64
1
1
1.70
1
1
1
1.19
1-M
1.31
Condi-
tion-
ality
5.87
4.36
10.32
1.81
3.73
.71
3.84
4.81
6.84
6.25
10.06
3.19
6.52
10.15
5.19
4.57
7.79
3.53
15.81
14.87
2.07
10.34
10.81
7.68
10.58
17.65
15.00
4.79
18.32
11.03
17.23
9.39
6.45
8.97
14.26
11.87
6.97
11.76
13.16
13.00
8.00
0-20
8.77
dents, would show high correlations.
Experiment 4: Experience and Bias
Experiments 1 and 3 demonstrated that
the frequencies of some lethal events are
consistently misjudged. In hopes of learning
more about the nature of these errors and
biases, Experiment 4 examined people's
direct and indirect experiences with these
events and some of the events' special char-
acteristics. Eight different characteristics
were assessed for each lethal event and then
used to predict the errors found in Experi-
568 LICHTENSTEIN ET AL.
ments 1 and 3. Four of the measures as-
sessed how much experience subjects feel
they have had with the different causes of
death. Two measures reflected the frequency
with which causes of death appear in news-
paper articles. The final measure reflected
the degree to which the various causes of
death were judged to be catastrophic (in-
flicting simultaneous multiple casualties)
and lethal (inevitably producing death for
people suffering from the condition).
Method
Experience ratings. A new group of 61 subjects
recruited through the University of Oregon cam-
pus newspaper was asked to rate each of the 41
causes of death according to their personal ex-
periences with the event as a cause of death and
suffering.
Two ratings of indirect experience were ob-
tained by asking subjects to indicate how often
they had heard about the event via the media
(newspapers, magazines, radio, television, etc.) as
(a) a cause of death and (b) a cause of suffering
(but not death). Ratings were made on a 5-point
scale whose extreme categories were never (coded
as 1) and often (coded as 5).
Subjects' direct experience with the 41 events
as causes of death were elicited by having them
check one of the following three statements for
each event: At least one close friend or relative
has died from this (Code 3) ; someone I know
(other than a close friend or relative) has died
from this (Code 2) ; no one I know has died from
this (Code 1). Direct experience with these events
as causes of suffering was elicited with similar
questions, with the word died replaced by the
phrases suffered (but not died).
Thus, each subject provided four ratings for
each of the 41 events. These were ratings of (a)
indirect death (coded 1 to 5), (b) indirect suffer-
ing (coded 1 to 5), (c) direct death (coded 1 to
3), and (d) direct suffering (coded 1 to 3).
Ncivspapcr coverage. The news media provide
two kinds of information about causes of death.
One, as noted earlier, is reports of statistical anal-
yses (Figure 1). The other, far more prevalent,
is the day-to-day reporting of fatalities as they
happen. The latter is likely to be biased toward
violent and catastrophic events (see, for example,
Arlen's [1975] survey of television's treatment of
death). Because of the potential importance of
media exposure, we supplemented people's ratings
of their indirect (media) experiences with a sur-
vey of newspaper reports. The local daily news-
paper (the Eugene Register-Guard) was ex-
amined on all days of alternative months for a
year, starting with January 1, 1975 (for a total of
184 days). Two tallies were made for each cause
of death: the total number of deaths reported and
the square inches of reporting devoted to the
deaths (excluding photographs).
Catastrophe ratings. Economist Theodore Berg-
strom (Note 2) has asked whether catastrophic
events with multiple victims in close geographic
and temporal proximity will be judged as more
Table 7
Direct Estimates Correlation Matrix
Variable 10 11 12 13
1. MVALGM
2. E LGM
3. MVA group residuals
4. E group residuals
5. Log true frequency
6. Indirect death
7. Indirect suffering
8. Direct death
9. Direct suffering
10. News frequency
11. News inches
12. Catastrophe
13. Conditional death
.98 —
.40 .35 —
.36 .38 .91 —
.89 .91 .00 .00
.85 .86 .45 .48
.86 .86 .46 .44
.90 .88 .19 .19
.52 .50 .22 .16
.56 .54 .59 .56
.45 .41 .45 .36
-.03 .02 .29 .40
.47 .51 .04 .08
.74
.76
.82
.46
.33
.29
-.12
.54 .65 .37 .47 -.28 .10 .30 -.07
Note. MVA = motor vehicle accident; E = electrocution; LGM = log geometric mean.
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likely than events that take as many lives but in
a less spectacular, one-at-a-time fashion. He hy-
pothesized that catastrophes are more spectacular
and thus more memorable, a speculation in keep-
ing with availability considerations. On the other
hand, the more frequent instances of noncatas-
trophic events may lead them to be judged more
accurately, whereas casualties from catastrophic
events may be underestimated because of their
massed presentation (Hintzman, 1976). To assess
catastrophic potential, 13 employees of the Oregon
Research Institute were asked to estimate the av-
erage number of people who die from a single
fatal episode of each of the 41 causes of death.
Conditional death ratings. In Experiments 1
and 3 subjects appeared to underestimate (rela-
tive to the regression line) the frequencies of
deaths due to events that are common in nonfatal
form, such as smallpox vaccination and asthma.
One possible explanation of this error is that
subjects confused P(event xjdeath) with P(death|
event x) and failed to appreciate the importance
of base rates (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Bar-
Hillel, Note 3). Consider the question of whether
a randomly selected death is more likely to be
due to smallpox or smallpox vaccination. This
question calls for comparing P(smallpox)death)
with P(smallpox vaccination]death), the latter
being statistically greater. However, subjects may
be relying on P( death [smallpox) and P(death[
smallpox vaccination) to answer such questions.
If the base rates for the two events are discrepant
(there are many more smallpox vaccinations than
cases of smallpox), the resulting judgments will be
in error.
To explore the role of this characteristic, 31
college students were asked to rate the proba-
bility of death given that one suffered from or
experienced each condition. The ratings were made
on a scale from 0 (surely won't die) to 20 (surely
will die).
Results
Mean values. Mean values for the six
subjective scales and the two newspaper
measures are shown in Table 6. As one
would expect, subjects reported greater ex-
perience with these events as causes of suf-
fering than as causes of death. The most
frequently experienced event was motor
vehicle accidents, while the lowest ratings
were given to poisoning by vitamins.
During 184 days of newspaper reporting,
19 of the listed causes of death were never
mentioned. Some of these 19 causes are
quite frequent: cancer of the digestive sys-
tem, diabetes, breast cancer, and tubercu-
losis. In contrast, the eighth most frequently
reported cause of death in the newspapers,
tornadoes, is in fact relatively rare. The re-
ported tornado deaths may represent all
deaths from this cause in the United States
during the dates covered. Note also that
homicide, which is 23% less frequent than
suicide, was reported 9.6 times as often,
with 15 times as much space devoted to it.B
Few of the listed causes of death were
classed as catastrophic in terms of the
judged number of people dying on a single
occasion. Flood, tornado, and motor vehicle/
train collisions led the catastrophe ratings.
The conditional death ratings seem rea-
sonable. The lowest rating was given to
smallpox vaccination, while the highest was
to homicide, followed by drowning. Some
chronic diseases—asthma, diabetes, syphilis,
and tuberculosis—were rated below the
overall mean of 8.77, but emphysema (11.03)
and heart disease (13.00) were both rated
well above the mean.
Correlations: direct estimates. Correla-
tional analyses were performed to deter-
mine whether the eight measures predict the
judgments and biases found in Experiment
3. Two aspects of the direct-estimate data
were predicted from the eight character-
istics : (a) the log geometric mean response
to the 40 lethal events (excluding small-
pox) and (b) the index of secondary bias
used in Experiment 3 (the signed difference
between the log geometric mean of the
judged frequencies and the log geometric
mean predicted by the quadratic regression
curves shown in Figures 9 and 10).
Table 7 shows the intercorrelation matrix
for the four response variables (log geo-
metric mean frequencies and residuals for
Group MVA and for Group E), the true
frequency, and the eight predictor variables.
The lower left rectangle of correlations in-
dicates the predictive power of the eight in-
dependent variables. Three of the four ex-
perience ratings showed strong correlations
with the four response variables. Note that
these ratings correlated more highly with
5
 This result may be even more extreme than
it appears, since there is good reason to suppose
that the official records we used to establish "true"
rates underestimate the frequency of suicide.
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the subjects' responses than with the true
frequencies. The ratings of direct suffering
showed only moderate correlations with
subjects' responses.
News frequency and news inches were
also modestly good predictors of the re-
sponse variables. They were poorly corre-
lated with true frequency, demonstrating
the biased view of reality that newspapers
present." The catastrophe ratings showed
quite low correlations with all other varia-
bles. This may be due, in part, to the lack
of variance in these ratings; over half were
equal to 1.0, and only 10 of 41 were greater
than 1.08. Finally, conditional death ratings
were moderately correlated with the geo-
metric mean responses, but not with the
residuals.
The correlations among the eight predic-
tor measures are also shown in Table 7.
Indirect death, indirect suffering, and direct
death ratings showed fairly high intercor-
relations but lower correlations with direct
suffering. The two newspaper measures
were highly intercorrelated. However, these
newspaper measures correlated only mod-
erately with the indirect death ratings, even
though the instructions for the latter task
emphasized newspaper coverage.
The direct estimates made by the subjects
in Experiment 3 may have been biased be-
cause they were influenced by past experi-
ence with indirect sources of information
(such as newspapers), which themselves
were biased. We suspected that ratings of
direct experience might be less biased and,
therefore, might provide more accurate es-
timates of the true frequencies than did the
direct estimates of frequency. This hypothe-
sis was tested and was not supported. Al-
though the direct death ratings did correlate
more highly with the true frequency (r =
.82) than did any of the other predictor
measures, the direct estimates of Experi-
ment 3 did even better (r = .89 and .91).
Correlations: paired comparisons. Simi-
lar correlational analyses were performed
relating the eight measures with the paired-
comparison judgments of Experiment 1.
To do this, a difference score was formed
on each measure for each of the 101 pairs
(excluding smallpox) by subtracting the
score associated with the less likely cause of
death from the score associated with the
more likely cause of death. These difference
scores were then correlated with four de-
pendent variables (the log geometric mean
responses and the index of secondary bias
used in Experiment 1, for students and for
league members), with the log true ratio,
and with each other. The resulting correla-
tion matrix is not shown here, because it
was quite similar to Table 7.
As with the direct-estimate data, the
ratio of the direct death ratings correlated
with true ratio more highly (r — .62) than
did any of the other predictor measures.
However, it could not successfully be sub-
stituted for the judged ratios of Experiment
1 in an attempt to improve accuracy, since
the judged ratios were even more highly
correlated with true ratio (r = .69 for stu-
dents and .75 for league members).
Regression analyses predicting responses
and biases. To bring greater clarity to this
mass of correlations, eight stepwise regres-
sions were performed. Four of these anal-
yses predicted the log geometric mean re-
sponses of the four separate groups of
subjects: students' paired comparisons,
league members' paired comparisons, Group
E's direct estimates, and Group MVA's di-
rect estimates. The other four stepwise re-
gression analyses predicted secondary bias
(the residuals from the correlations of each
of these four groups with the statistical fre-
quencies).
The predictor variables for each of the
stepwise regressions were the eight mea-
sures previously described, using differences
between 101 pairs to predict the paired-
comparison data or 40 mean ratings to pre-
dict the direct estimates and their residuals.
Because of the instability of stepwise re-
gression solutions with highly intercorre-
lated predictors, our primary criterion for
variable selection was replicability. Only
variables that entered the equations for both
league and student subjects in Experiment
6
 Similar evidence of bias in another newspaper
may be found in Combs and Slovic (Note 4).
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Table 8
Variables Emerging from Stepwise Multiple Regressions in Both Replications
Dependent variables
Log geometric mean Residuals
Paired comparisons Direct estimates Paired comparisons Direct estimates
Indirect suffering
Direct death
Indirect suffering
Direct death
News frequency
Indirect death
Direct death
Conditional death"
News frequency
catastrophe
• Negative weight.
1 or both Group E and Group MVA in Ex-
periment 2 are discussed. Table 8 lists the
variables that emerged from both groups of
subjects. The inclusion criterion was an F
to enter7 of 3.0 or greater. The log geo-
metric means were highly predictable, with
Rs ranging from .88 to .96 using just three
of the eight predictors. The residuals were
also predictable, with Rs ranging from .64
to .80 using the variables selected by the
stepwise regression.
Two variables, indirect suffering and di-
rect death, did most of the job of predicting
the subjects' log geometric mean responses
for both paired comparisons and direct esti-
mates. The regressions on the residuals
show a more mixed pattern. For the re-
siduals from the paired-comparison data,
three predictors were common to both the
student and league data: indirect death, di-
rect death, and conditional death. Condi-
tional death had a negative weight because
of its low correlation with the dependent
variable and its high correlation with in-
direct death. For the prediction of residuals
from the direct estimates, news frequency
and catastrophe ratings were the only pre-
dictors that were significant in both groups.
In view of the highly skewed distributions
of these two measures, it is somewhat sur-
prising to see them emerge as valid predic-
tors. However, news frequency correlated
with direct-estimate residuals higher than
did any other single predictor. Of the 7
causes of death with catastrophe ratings of
1.5 or greater, six (all accidents, motor ve-
hicle accidents, flood, botulism, tornado, and
fire and flames) were among the 10 causes
of death with the highest residuals (i.e., the
10 most overestimated causes of death, rela-
tive to the regression line).
The above analyses indicate that mea-
sures tapping the availability of information
about causes of death do a good job of pre-
dicting subjects' judgments of the frequen-
cies and relative frequencies of these causes
of death. Further, we have shown that the
consistent errors people make (the second-
ary bias) can be predicted from salient fea-
tures of the events such as their catastrophic
nature and from ratings of experience with
the lethal events made by a different group
of subjects.
Experiment 5: Debiasing
Experiments 1 and 3 showed that sub-
jects make severe and consistent errors in
judging the frequency or relative frequency
of lethal events. Experiment 5 was designed
to see if subjects could correct these errors
when they were told the hypothesized causes
of the errors. Emphasis was placed on the
secondary bias and its possible causes: un-
even newspaper coverage and the effects of
imaginability and memorability.
Study 5A
Method
In Study 5A, subjects made paired comparisons
for 31 of the 106 pairs of Experiment 1. Twenty-
one of these pairs were severely misjudged in
Experiment 1 (either the percentage correct was
7
 An "F to enter" tests the significance of the
increase in the proportion of explained variance
achieved by including an additional variable in the
regression equation.
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less than 60% or the geometric mean was off by
a factor of 9 or more). The geometric means of
the remaining 10 were estimated moderately well
(within a factor of l.S). The present study was
conducted with a college student population simi-
lar to that in Experiment 1 and with the same
instructions except that one group, the debiasing
group (re = 30), was given the following special
information:
Note: In a previous study of this kind we
found that, for some pairs, the relative likeli-
hoods were greatly misperceived. Sometimes
the ratio of the more likely to the less likely
item was judged to be much greater than it
really was. In other cases the ratio was judged
much too small or even in the wrong direction;
that is, the less likely item was judged to be
more likely.
We believe that when people estimate these
likelihoods, they do so on the basis of a) how
easy it is to imagine someone dying from such
a cause, b) how many instances of such an event
they can remember happening to someone they
know, c) publicity about such events in the
news media, or d) special features of the event
that make it stand out in one's mind.
Reliance on imaginability, memorability, and
media publicity, although often useful, can lead
to large errors in judgment. When events are
disproportionately imaginable or memorable, they
are likely to be overestimated. When they are
rather unmemorable or unpublicized or other-
wise undistinguished, they are likely to be under-
estimated. Events such as ulcers that are com-
mon, but usually non-fatal, may also be under-
estimated because people tend to imagine or
remember them in their non-fatal form.
Try not to let your own judgments be biased by
factors such as imaginability, memorability, or
media publicity.
A control group (» —22) also judged the 31 pairs
without receiving any special instructions.
Results
Examination of percentage correct re-
vealed no evidence for debiasing. The origi-
nal subjects (Experiment 1) were best on
9 pairs, the control subjects were best on
12 pairs, and the debiasing group subjects
were best on 10 pairs.
A further search for improvement in the
data of Study 5A can be made by compar-
ing the ratio judgments of these two new
groups of subjects either with the true ra-
tios (under the assumption that the in-
structions exhorted the subjects to come
closer to the truth) or with the ratios pre-
dicted from the regression analysis of the
original subjects (under the assumption
that the instructions emphasized the nature
of the secondary bias, not the primary bias).
No evidence for effective debiasing can be
seen under either comparison. For geo-
metric means, when the comparison is made
to the true ratio, the original group was
best on 12 pairs, the controls on 6 pairs,
and the debiasing group on 13 pairs. When
compared with the predicted ratios, the
original group was best on 12 pairs, the
control group on 7, and the debiasing group
on 12. Looking only at the 21 pairs that
were originally judged poorly, there is still
no evidence of improvement in the debias-
ing group. Even those pairs on which the
debiasing group did best showed only mod-
est improvement. For example, death by
diabetes is 95 times more likely than death
by syphilis. The debiasing group was "su-
perior" in giving a geometric mean response
of 9.7 rather than the original group's geo-
metric mean of 2.4. Death by stroke is
102,000 times more likely than death by
botulism. The value predicted by the regres-
sion analysis of the original subjects was
1,002. Those original subjects showed a
strong secondary bias; their geometric mean
response was 106. The debiasing group
gave a mean response of 135.
Method
Study 5B
A second debiasing study was undertaken to
provide subjects even more opportunity for using
knowledge of the secondary biases to improve
their performance. The subjects, drawn from the
same student population, were shown 19 pairs of
events. The instructions indicated that each of
these pairs had been seriously misjudged in an
earlier experiment (which was the case). For
each pair, the subjects were given the response
from Experiment 1 and were asked to improve it,
that is, to give a new response that they thought
would be closer to the true ratio.
The instructions for a debiasing group of 29
subjects included a discussion of the presumed
sources of error, illustrated with several examples
showing the possible effects of personal experi-
ence, media publicity, imaginability, and the like
on previous subjects' judgments. A control group
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of 27 subjects did not receive this additional
discussion.
The instructions read as follows. Brackets in-
dicate material shown only to the debiasing group.
We recently studied the ability of University of
Oregon students to judge the likelihood of vari-
ous causes of death in the United States.
For example, subjects were given a pair of
events such as:
A. Measles,
B. Tornado.
They were asked: Which causes more deaths
annually in the U.S., A or B? They were also
asked to estimate how many times more likely
the more frequent cause of death was compared
to the less frequent of the two.
We found that, for some pairs, the relative like-
lihoods were greatly misjudged. Sometimes the
ratio of the more likely to the less likely item
was judged much too small or even in the wrong
direction; that is, the less likely item was
judged to be more likely.
[We believe that when people estimate these
frequencies, they do so on the basis of a) how
easy it is to imagine someone dying from such
a cause, b) how many instances of such an event
they can remember happening to someone they
know, c) publicity about such events in the news
media, or d) special features of the event that
make it stand out in one's mind.]
[When events are disproportionately imaginable
or memorable, they are likely to be overesti-
mated. When they are rather unmemorable or
unpublicized or otherwise undistinguished, they
are likely to be underestimated. Events such as
accidental falls, that are common but usually
non-fatal, may also be underestimated because
people tend to imagine or remember them in
their non-fatal form.]
On the following pages there are 19 pairings of
death-producing events. The relative likelihood
of the more common to the less common event
was greatly misperceived in each of these pairs.
[We want to see whether you can reduce the
magnitude of the errors for these pairs. To do
this think about how factors such as media
coverage or ease of imagining or remembering
the event as a cause of death are likely to work
to bias the judgments for each of the pairs.]
Here are some examples to illustrate the task:
Previous
Answer
Your
Answer
A. Hepatitis B 4.SS
B. Drowning
The average subject chose B as more likely
and judged it to be 4.55 times more likely than
A. Which would you choose and what ratio
would you give?
Actually, the correct answer is B and the true
ratio is 10.9 to 1. We see that the average sub-
ject overestimated Hepatitis relative to Drown-
ing. [Maybe this is because of the special at-
tention given by the media to Hepatitis, espe-
cially in relation to abuse of hypodermic needles.]
Try this one:
A. Leukemia
B. Accidental Falls
Previous
Answer
A 1.30
Your
Answer
The average subject thought death from leu-
kemia was 30% more common (ratio 1.30 to
1) than death from falls. However, death from
falls is really 20% more frequent. So the correct
answer is B with a ratio of 1.20. [The error may
stem from the dramatic nature of leukemia and
the greater amount of media publicity it re-
ceives, or it may stem from the fact that acci-
dental falls are common but usually non-fatal.]
For a final example, consider:
A. Poisoning by solid
or liquid
B. Tuberculosis
Previous
Answer
A 5.26
Your
Answer
The average subject thought death by poisoning
was 5.26 times more likely than death from tu-
berculosis. However, death from tuberculosis is
really 44% more frequent than death from poi-
soning so the correct answer is B with a ratio
of 1.44. [Again, it is easy to see how media
publicity regarding poisoning and the dramatic
nature of the event could cause subjects to over-
estimate it compared to the drab, undramatic,
perhaps old-fashioned disease, tuberculosis.]
Note that a ratio of 1.20 means 20% more
likely, 1.50 means 50% more likely, 1.80 means
more likely, etc.
For each pair, write the letter of the item you
think is a more likely cause of death and give
your judgment about how many times more
frequent the more frequent item is.
Results
The special instructions given to the de-
biasing group had no effect on performance.
Neither the debiasing group nor the control
group was able to improve consistently upon
the mean responses given by subjects in
Experiment 1. For each pair, we calculated
the percentage of subjects in the debiasing
group and in the control group whose re-
sponses were closer to the true ratio than
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was the geometric mean of the original Ex-
periment 1 group. We also calculated the
percentage of subjects in both groups whose
responses were closer to the ratio predicted
from the Experiment 1 regression line (i.e.,
who had smaller secondary bias). In every
case the percentage closer to the true ratio
was equal to the percentage closer to the
regression line. The average percentage of
improved answers was only 53.8% for the
experimental group (range of 21%-82%)
and 52.4% for the control group (range
of 37%-70%). The experimental group
showed a better improvement percentage
than the control group on 10 pairs, the con-
trol group was better for 8 pairs, and there
was a tie on 1 pair.
Discussion
Psychological Significance
As in laboratory studies, our subjects ex-
hibited some competence in judging fre-
quency. Frequency estimates for causes of
death, words, and occupations generally in-
creased with increases in true frequency;
similarly, the discriminability of causes in-
creased with the ratio of their statistical
frequencies. Furthermore, our subjects' as-
sessments of the frequencies of causes of
death, both direct estimates and paired com-
parisons, correlated more highly with the
true answers than did any other measures,
such as newspaper reportage and ratings of
direct experience with the causes of death.
Despite the sensitivity of judgments to
true frequency, the overall accuracy of both
paired comparisons and direct estimates of
frequency was quite poor. Unless the true
frequencies of a pair of lethal events dif-
fered by more than a factor of two, there
was no guarantee that subjects could cor-
rectly indicate which was more frequent.
Large errors were present in the judged
ratios for many pairs of events. The high
correlations between direct estimates and
true frequency across almost a million-to-
one range of the latter variable are deceptive.
Large errors were present in these esti-
mates, much as with the paired-comparison
judgments.
Primary bias. Experiments 1 and 3 dem-
onstrated a strong primary bias, consisting
of overestimation of low frequencies and
underestimation of both high frequencies
and large ratios, much as has been found
before by Attneave (1953), Teigen (1973),
and others (Poulton, 1973). We considered
and rejected two possible reasons for this
primary bias. One is that subjects avoid
using extremely high (or low) numbers in
making their responses. The absence of such
biases with the words and occupations tasks
of Experiment 2 makes this hypothesis im-
plausible. Second, the underestimation of
high ratios in Experiment 1 was not simply
an artifact of averaging correct and incor-
rect answers. This is shown by the per-
sistence of the effect for pairs in which
nearly everyone got the correct answer.
Another possible explanation of the pri-
mary bias is that it results from anchoring:
Subjects first choose some representative
value and then adjust upward or downward
according to whatever considerations seem
relevant to the case at hand. Studies of an-
choring and adjustment procedures have
shown that such adjustments tend to be
insufficient (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A number of
laboratory studies of frequency estimation
can be interpreted as showing a tendency
to anchor on the average frequency in the
lists learned (see Rowe & Rose, 1977). In-
sufficient adjustment would produce too
flat a curve, a finding often noted in labora-
tory studies (see Hintzman, 1976). Per-
haps the clearest evidence of anchoring may
be found in Experiment 3, in which the one
true frequency given to the subjects could
easily have served as an anchor value. Group
MVA, who were given a high anchor
(50,000), generally assigned higher values
to the items than did Group E, whose an-
chor value was 1,000.
In the paired-comparison tasks no such
clear-cut anchor was provided. Nonetheless,
Poulton (1968) has shown that in magni-
tude-estimation studies, the subjective mag-
nitude of the first stimulus presented serves
as an anchor for subsequent judgments.
This view is supported by Carroll's (1971)
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finding of a .66 correlation between the log
of individual subjects' first estimates and
the mean log of all their responses in esti-
mating word frequency. The present paired-
comparison data are consistent with the
notion that the response to the first stimulus
serves as an anchor. The causes-of-death
groups received, as their first stimulus, a
pair they judged as having a relatively low
ratio (pair 40; geometric mean response =
4.3 for students and 18.0 for league mem-
bers), while the words and occupations
groups' first stimulus was judged with rela-
tively high ratios (116 and 265, respec-
tively ). Both causes-of-death groups showed
more underestimation of high ratios than
did the words and occupations groups, as
Poulton would predict.
Yet another possible explanation of the
primary bias derives from the availability
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973),
which states that assessments of frequency
or probability are based on the number of
instances of the event that come to mind.
Cohen (1966) has found that when subjects
manage to recall any of the words in a cate-
gory the mean number of words recalled
per category is relatively independent of the
number of words in that category. If this
tendency is true also for categories learned
outside the laboratory, such as causes of
death, and if, as suggested by Tversky and
Kahneman, people base their assessments
on these all-too-equal recollections, a flat-
tening of their responses, as observed, would
result.
Secondary bias. Subjects' responses ex-
hibited numerous strong and consistent sec-
ondary biases. Some portion of these errors
may be due to the unrepresentative cover-
age of these causes of death in the news
media. Others have also speculated about
the effects of such media bias. For exam-
ple, Zebroski (Note 5) blamed the media
for people's concerns about nuclear reactor
safety. He noted that "fear sells"; the media
dwell on potential catastrophes and not
on the successful day-to-day operations of
power plants. Author Richard Bach (1973)
made a similar observation about the fear
shown by a young couple going for their
first airplane ride:
In all that wind and engineblast and earth tilting
and going small below us, I watched my Wis-
consin lad and his girl, to see them change. De-
spite their laughter, they had been afraid of the
airplane. Their only knowledge of flight came
from newspaper headlines, a knowledge of colli-
sions and crashes and fatalities. They had never
read a single report of a little airplane taking off,
flying through the air and landing again safely.
They could only believe that this must be possible,
in spite of all the newspapers, and on that belief
they staked their three dollars and their lives,
(p. 37)
The present results suggest that the media
have important effects on our judgments,
not only because of what they don't report
(successful plane trips or reactor opera-
tions), but because of what they do report
to a disproportionate extent.
Subjects may also be misinformed be-
cause of bias in their direct exposure to the
various causes of death. Young people, such
as our student subjects, may be underex-
posed to death from diseases associated
with age, such as stroke, stomach cancer,
and diabetes, all of which were underesti-
mated, and overexposed to death from
motor vehicle accidents, all accidents, and
pregnancy, all of which were overestimated
relative to the regression line.
The two explanations of secondary bias
given above assume that the bias occurs
because the information received by the
subject is inadequate or misleading. An-
other explanation can be found by exam-
ining hypotheses about the biases induced
by people's cognitive storage and retrieval
processes. Tversky and Kahneman's (1973)
concept of availability, with its emphasis on
vivid or sensational events, seems relevant.
Examination of Figures 9 and 10 shows
that among the most overestimated causes
of death (relative to the regression line)
were botulism, tornado, flood, homicide,
motor vehicle accidents, all accidents, and
cancer. These are all sensational events.
Most of the causes of death that were
underestimated (relative to the regression
line)—asthma, tuberculosis, diabetes, stom-
ach cancer, stroke, and heart disease—seem
to be undramatic, quiet killers.
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Some of the evidence of secondary bias
is inconsistent with previous laboratory find-
ings. One such finding is that more concrete
and imaginable words are judged to be less
likely than equally frequent abstract words
(e.g., Ghatala & Levin, 1976). While we
had no direct measure of imaginability, one
might assume that catastrophic events and
those more heavily reported in the media
tend to be more concrete and imaginable.
However, all three of these surrogate mea-
sures of imaginability (catastrophe, news
frequency, and news inches) were positively
correlated with the residuals (for both
paired comparisons and direct estimates).
Thus, in this sense imaginable events tended
to be judged more likely, as predicted by
availability considerations.
Another difference between the present
research and previous studies is found with
catastrophic causes of death whose occur-
rences tend to be massed rather than dis-
tributed over time. Laboratory studies
(e.g., Rowe & Rose, 1977) have consist-
ently found that massing the occurrences
of a word in a learned list tends to decrease
its estimated frequency. Two explanations
offered for this effect (Hintzman, 1976) are
(a) encoding variability—spaced repetitions
are more likely to receive differential cod-
ing than massed items—and (b) deficient
processing of massed items. In the current
experiments, catastrophic (massed) events
tended to be overestimated relative to the
regression line. One key difference between
the usual laboratory experiments and the
present study is that the former do not use
stimuli that become sensational or emo-
tionally charged when massed. Such special
characteristics may lead to extra processing,
rather than to deficient processing, for cata-
strophic causes of death.
When we have been able to compare the
present results with previous laboratory
work, we have found about as many mis-
matches as matches. The present study is
based on material our subjects have learned
in the real world; in most other laboratory
work, the subjects were tested on material
they had learned in the laboratory. Mand-
ler (Note 6) has speculated on this dif-
ference :
In terms of presentation of to-be-remembered ma-
terial, the laboratory experiment fails—in com-
parison with the real world—with respect to
three major problems: Frequency, salience, and
context. The laboratory experiments fail with re-
spect to frequency because the typical event that
an individual must recall or recognize in everyday
life has been encountered anywhere from a few
to thousands of times; in the laboratory we look
at the few and rarely look at the thousands.
Salience must be of interest because encoding op-
erations in the real world typically take place
with particular attention to the relevance or sali-
ence of a particular event to other aspects of the
mental apparatus; we encode what is important,
while in the laboratory we are required to encode
what is unimportant. Furthermore, the context of
real world memory involves not simply a restricted
number of materials presented in the laboratory,
together with a computer or a memory drum,
but rather the larger context of the individual's
current plans and intentions, geographic location,
and social conditions, (pp. 3-4)
Improving Judgments
One question raised by this study is how
to improve intuitive judgments of fre-
quency. We did not attempt here to correct
the primary (overestimation/underestima-
tion) bias. Work by Teigen (1973) sug-
gests that this can be done by asking people
to allocate frequencies as percentages of the
total rather than having them estimate ab-
solute numbers. This technique, however,
might not prove helpful when (as with
causes of death) the largest frequency is
over a million times larger than the smallest
frequency. It would be exceedingly difficult
for subjects to express ratios even as high
as 3,000:1 (as they did in the present
study) using a percentage response mode.
Statistical correction, using regression equa-
tions, might be the best way to correct the
primary bias.
Since the secondary bias observed here
seems linked to availability, we hoped to
reduce that bias by informing subjects
about its probable source. This information
was not useful. The failure of such frontal
attacks to eliminate biases (see also Fisch-
hoff, 1977) suggests some directed restruc-
turing of judgment tasks may be necessary.
For example, Selvidge (1972) proposed
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having people make probability and fre-
quency judgments on a scale in which other
familiar events serve as marker points. In
composing such a scale, great care would
have to be taken to use only events whose
subjective ordering fits their true ordering.
Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff (1977) have
shown that requiring people to work hard to
produce specific examples of classes of
events before estimating the frequencies of
the classes can partially reduce availability
bias. Another promising suggestion comes
from Armstrong, Denniston, and Gordon
(1975), who found that numerical estimates
can be improved by having estimators de-
compose the original question into a series
of subquestions about which they are more
knowledgeable and whose answers lead
logically to the estimate of interest. For ex-
ample, an answer to the question "How
many people were killed in motor vehicle
accidents in the United States in 1970?"
might be improved by having people answer
the following related questions: (a) What
is the population of the U.S.? (b) How
many automobile trips does the average
U.S. citizen take in a year? (c) What is
the probability of a fatal injury on any par-
ticular trip? From the answers to these
questions, one can calculate an answer to
the original question.
Societal Implications
Economist Frank Knight once observed
that "We are so built that what seems rea-
sonable to us is likely to be confirmed by
experience or we could not live in the world
at all" (Knight, 1921, p. 227). But the pres-
ent study and a growing body of other re-
search (e.g., Kunreuther et al, 1978; Slo-
vic, Kunreuther, & White, 1974; Kates,
Note 1) indicate that in the evaluation of
risks and hazards, Knight's optimistic as-
sessment of human capabilities is wrong.
People do not have accurate knowledge of
the risks they face. As our society puts
more and more effort into the regulation
and control of these risks (banning cycla-
mates in food, lowering highway speed
limits, paying for emergency coronary-care
equipment, etc.), it becomes increasingly
important that these biases be recognized
and, if possible, corrected. Improved pub-
lic education is needed before we can expect
the citizenry to make reasonable public-
policy decisions about societal risks (Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1976; Slovic et
al., 1974). And the experts who guide and
influence these policies should be aware that
when they rely on their own experience,
memory, and common sense, they, too, may
be susceptible to bias.
We have, by necessity, studied sources of
judgmental error in situations for which good
estimates of true frequency exist. But our so-
ciety must often make judgments about haz-
ardous activities for which adequate statistical
data is lacking, such as recombinant DNA re-
search or nuclear waste disposal. We suspect
that the biases found here (overestimation of
rare events, underestimation of likely events,
and an undue influence of drama or vivid-
ness) may be operating, indeed, may even
be amplified, in such situations.
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